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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
JOSEPH ANSELMO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14578 
--------------£--------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crimes of kidnapping 
and aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated§§ 76-5-301 and 76-5-405 (Supp. 1973). He was 
tried to a jury in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by the jury for the 
above mentioned crimes. Sentence was imposed April 1, 
1976, ordering appellant to serve an indeterminate term 
of zero to five years for kidnapping and five years to 
life for aggravated sexual assault, the terms to run 
concurrently. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming 
appellant's conviction in the lower court for aggravated 
sexual assault. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Laura Margaret Lund received a phone call from 
a friend, Bonnie Christensen, on September 20, 1975, 
asking Laura to meet her at a restaurant in Salt Lake 
City (Tr.30). When Laura arrived she saw Bonnie standing 
with two men. She asked Bonnie what was going on and 
why the men were there (Tr.31). After discussion, Laura 
went with Bonnie to a laundromat and then to an apartment 
where she met appellant for the first time (Tr.35). 
While at the apartment appellant asked Laura to be his 
"old lady". She told him she was not interested but 
agreed to go with the group of people in the apart.~ent 
to another house to celebrate Bonnie's birthday. The 
group of people went to a house on 3rd South and 1048 
West to listen to music and drink (Tr.44). Shortly 
after arriving appellant told Laura to remove her bra 
or "we'll take it off for you" (Tr.45). Appellant 
then pulled Laura into a side room and began making 
sexual advances. Laura resisted physically and verbally 
and began yelling that she wanted to leave Tr. 8,49). 
Appellant then "pulled back his fist" and hit her in 
the face (Tr· 49,50). Laura fell onto a bed still 
yelling that she wanted to leave and appellant hit her 
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again (Tr.SO). She testified thatshe was scared, even 
hysterical and didn't know how or where appellant was 
hitting her (Tr.50,57). Laura said she had to go to 
the bathroom and appellant released her. He followed 
her to the bathroom and hit her again in the face (Tr•53). 
Appellant then pulled her back to the side room with Laura 
resisting and struggling constantly. She was released 
temporarily and pleaded with one of the women present 
to calm appellant because "that guy is going to kill 
me" (Tr.56). Appellant then dragged Laura back into 
the side room, held his fist on her throat and drew 
his other fist back. Laura testified that she didn't 
want to be hurt anymore, put her hand down and was 
raped by appellant (Tr .58). 
Laura attempted to leave the next morning but 
appellant told her to "shut up and lay back down" (Tr•62). 
Appellant then raped her again after his friend, J.T. 
threatened her with a hanuner (Tr·65). Laura was kept in 
the house until Monday morning when she finally escaped 
after having been raped twice more by appellant 
(Tr. 75-76, 210). 
Laura was examined by a physician who testified 
that her face had bruises and abrasions but the doctor 
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was unable to determine if she was raped because of 
several factors (Tr.126,129,131). Laura also talked 
with the police and this conversation led to appellant's 
arrest and subsequent conviction of aggravated sexual 
assault (Tr~l33). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO REDUCE COUNT II FROM AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT TO 
SIMPLE RAPE. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to reduce Count II to simple 
rape because "there was no evidence of a specific 
threat to kidnap Laura Margaret Lund, cause her 
death, or to inflict serious bodily injury upon her 
immediately." (Appellant's brief, p. 8). This 
contention has no foundation in the record of the 
trial, or in case law. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-405 
(1953, as amended), delineates the elements of 
aggravated sexual assault. It states: 
"(l) A person commits aggravated 
sexual assault if: 
(a) In the course of a rape or 
attempted rape or forcible sodomy 
or attempted forcible sodomy: 
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(i) The actor causes serious 
bodily injury to the victim; or 
(ii) The actor compels submission 
to the rape or forcible sodomy by 
threat of kidnaping, death, or 
serious bodily injury to be in-
flicted imminently on any person. 
(b) The victim of a rape or 
attempted rape or sodomy or 
attempted sodomy is under fourteen 
years of age. 
(2) Aggravated sexual assault is 
a felony of the first degree." 
The record of the trial sufficiently establishes 
the elements mentioned in subsection (a) (i). Laura 
Lund testified that appellant made sexual advances and 
then hit her in the face with his fist when she 
resisted (Tr.49-50). The testimony was corroborated by 
appellant's own admission (Tr.184,200) and the testimony 
of other witnesses (Tr.116, 134,148). Laura began 
yelling and appellant hit her again (Tr.SO). It appears 
from Laura's testimony that this attack made her 
hysterical. She stated that she couldn't tell how 
appellant hit her or where after the first blows 
(Tr.50,57,116,160). Appellant followed Laura into 
the bathroom and hit her again in the face with his 
fist (Tr.53). Laura testified that she screamed at 
one of the women present "that guy is going to kill 
me • " ( Tr • 5 6) • 
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It is well established that the kind of physical 
force that may induce fear in the mind of a woman is 
inmaterial. People v. Harris, 108 C.A.2d 84, 238 P.2d 
158 (1952). Certainly the force employed by appellant 
(a man 5'11" tall, weighing 205 lbs. Tr.212) was 
sufficient to cause Laura Lund to fear death or 
serious bodily injury. She neither knew appellant, 
nor did she know the other people present in the 
house except one woman. Appellant hit Laura in the 
face with his fist repeatedly and finally pushed one 
fist on her throat and held the other back prepared 
to strike ~er again, before she submitted to his 
attack. 
While appellant did not specifically articulate 
his intent to kill or seriously injure Laura, such 
articulation is not necessary to constitute a threat. 
The general rule is that a threat in situations like 
the present may be expressed by acts or conduct as 
well as words. See State v. Bouldin, 153 Mont. 276, 
456 P.2d 830 (1969) where a jury instruction to that 
effect was challenged on appeal and the giving of the 
instruction was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court. 
Appellant's conduct constituted a threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to Laura Lund. His 
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conduct indicated his persistance, his strength, his 
willingness to hurt and physically injure his victim, 
and his lack of concern for Laura Lund's pain or 
humiliation. 
Appellant also threatened his victim with 
kidnaping. Laura testified that the first morning 
after she was raped she attempted to dress and appellant 
said "Where do you think you're going .•• shut up and 
lay back down." (Tr.62). Appellant then informed 
her that the windows were nailed shut if she had "any 
ideas about going through the windows •• " (Tr.64). 
That threat was bolstered by the conduct of appellant's 
friend indicating that others in the house would detain 
Laura or injure her if she resisted (Tr.65). State 
v. Barnett, 85 N.M. 404, 512 P.2d 977 (1973) posits 
that it is immaterial in a rape case whether threats 
are made by the defendant or someone else. 
Respondent maintains that appellant's conduct 
satisfied the elements of aggravated sexual assault. 
We reject appellant's claim that Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-5-405(a) (ii) contemplated the exclusion of an 
assault with bare hands. Appellant cites no case 
authority supporting that allegation. Moreover, it is 
common knowledge that people can and do kill with their 
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bare hands. Given the disproportionate size of appellant 
and his female victim it is reasonable to believe that 
Laura Lund considered appellant's violent attack a 
threat to kill her or seriously injure her. When 
appellant's assaultive conduct is coupled with the 
actual kidnaping of Laura Lund and the threat by 
appellant's friend with a hammer (Tr.65) the elements 
of Utah Code Annotated 76-S-405(a) (ii) are uncontro-
vertibly established. 
On the basis of the foregoing, appella.nt' s con-
viction for aggravated sexual assault should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTION ON THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF 
RESISTANCE REQUIRED IN A RAPE CASE. 
Appellant proposed the following instruction 
on resistance: 
You are instructed that the woman 
must resist the force of violence 
or threats of immediate or serious 
bodily harm directed at her to the 
extent that seems reasonable under 
the circumstances. Mere passive 
resistance is not sufficient. Resis-
tance must be by acts and not by 
mere words. If a woman objects 
verbally to the act of intercourse, 
but by her conduct consents to it, 
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the element of lack of consent has 
not been shown beyond a--reasonable 
doubt and you must acquit the defend-
ant. Further, if her opposition 
appears after a period of apparent 
cor.sentual behavior, that opposition 
to amount to resistance sufficient to 
constitute the lack of consent element 
of the offense, must be such that a 
reasonable man under the circumstances 
would have no question but that con-
sent was being withheld. If you do 
not find such resistance beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must acquit. 
The court refused this proffered instruction and 
instead gave the following instruction: 
"Without consent" means that Laura 
Margaret Lund was compelled to submit 
to sexual intercourse by force or 
fear that overcame such earnest 
resistance as she might reasonably be 
expected to have demonstrated under 
the circumstances. 
To constitute the resistance required by 
the law of this State on the part of the 
female, the State must prove to your 
satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the female manifested her opposition 
to the perpetrator of the act by doing 
what her age, strength, the surrounding 
facts and all of the attending circumstances 
make it reasonable for her to do to 
manifest that opposition, or to show by 
such proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she was prevented from so resisting 
by threats of immediate and great bodily 
harm accompanied by the apparent power 
or execution of such harm. 
The amount or kind of force required to 
overcome the resistance required of the 
female is relative, depending upon the 
particular circumstances, but in any 
case it must be sufficient to subject 
and put the dissenting woman within the 
power of the man and thus enable him 
to have his intercourse with her not-
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withstanding good faith resistance 
on her part. Thus, no particular 
amount of force or no particular 
kind of force is necessary so long 
as it is sufficient to overcome the 
resistance required of the female as 
hereinabove set forth. 
However, in determining the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support a conviction 
of rape, you must consider the case 
of assertion of the forcible accomplish-
ment of the act, the difficulty of 
disproving that assertion, and the 
proneness of a woman to minimize her 
fault by asserting force or violence 
or the requisite threats. 
(Instruction 26; R. 440) 
Respondent contends that the instruction given 
by the court was proper and correctly stated the law 
concerning resistance in a rape case. The instruction 
requested by appellant is misleading and misconstrues 
the amount and degree of resistance which the law 
requires of a woman who is raped. State v. Glidden, 
(Mont.) 529 P.2d 1384 (1974) at p. 1386 explains the 
amount of resistance necessary in a rape case. The 
Montana Supreme court states: 
"The law does not put her life 
into even greater jeopardy than 
it is already in. When a woman 
is dealing with a man bent on rape, 
how can she know how much resistance 
she can give without provoking 
him into killing her? Continuous 
resistance to an attempted rape 
is not required. This Court in 
State v. Metcalf, 153 Mont. 369 
376, 457 P.2d 453, 457 (1969), held: 
"The defendant does not, however, 
have the right to an instruction which, 
to the exclusion of some elements 
of a crime, would mislead the jury 
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to believe that constant physical 
resistance which required force 
to overcome was an essential 
element.n 
Appellant cites State v. Beeny, 115 Ut. 168, 
203 P.2d 397 (1949) to illustrate a proper instruction 
on resistance in a rape trial. The facts of Beeny, supra, 
are much different than in the instant case. In 
Beeny, the prosecutrix met the defendants in a bar, 
was somewhat intimate with one defendant while in the 
bar, left the bar and then freely returned to be alone 
with the defendants in a car. Such conduct would 
warrant an instruction which explains that some resistance 
by the prosecutrix in the bar would not be sufficient 
to constitute resistance for an entirely separate episode 
considerably later and in a different situation. 
In the present case, Laura Lund's resistance 
was substantial and lasted for several days. Considering 
the circumstances of her kidnaping and beating continuous 
resistance for over seventy-two hours would be unreasonable 
and impossible. 
Appellant characterizes Laura Lund's resistance 
as "slight". (Appellant's brief p. 14). This description 
is inaccurate and contradictory to the record. Laura 
Lund testified that she pushed appellant away when 
he first made sexual advances. She began yelling and 
trying to get out of the side room where appellant had 
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her trapped (Tr.48-50). Even this amount of resistance 
produced a blow in the face from appellant (Tr.SO). 
Appellant struck Laura again soon after without 
provocation. After these blows Laura still resisted 
and "struggled" (Tr. 51 1. 27). She escaped to the 
bathroom where appellant hit her again and dragged 
her back into the side room (Tr.53). They continued 
to struggle and Laura escaped to the bathroom again 
(Tr.55). She was forced back into the side room and 
another struggle ensued (Tr.57-58). Finally appellant 
"got fed up with my fighting" and after another threat 
Laura was raped. 
Laura Lund resisted the attacks by appellant 
both physically and verbally. She was scared, even 
hysterical and she had been hit brutally in the face 
at least three times by a large man. She could not 
escape and other people present were clearly not 
sympathetic to her plight. 
The facts of the case establish that Laura 
Lund resisted to the extent (and beyond) that her 
age, strength, the surrounding facts and all the 
attending circumstances made it reasonable for her to 
manifest opposition. Moreover, such resistance was 
overcome by physical violence and imminent threat of 
serious bodily injury and death. 
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The court did not commit error in refusing appellant's 
proposed instruction on resistance in a rape case, and 
the conviction rendered below should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
25 BECAUSE IT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS 
NOT INTENDED TO CONFUSE THE JURY. 
The challenged instruction states: 
An act of sexual intercourse is without 
the consent of the victim under any of 
the following circumstances: 
1. When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as might 
reasonably be expected under the cir-
cumstances; or 
2. The actor compels the victim to submit 
or participate by any threat that would 
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary 
resolution; or 
3. The victim has not consented and the 
actor knows the victim is unconscious, 
unaware that the act is occurring, or 
physically unable to resist. 
Appellant specifically objects to paragraph 3 
above claiming that it was unsupported by the evidence 
and misleading to the jury. 
Respondent maintains that the inclusion of 
paragraph 3 in the above instruction was not reversible 
error for the following reasons. There is support for 
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paragraph 3 in the record; it did not mislead or 
confuse the jury (nor was it calculated to) when 
considered together with all the instructions; case 
law condemns such an instruction where appellant 
has failed to show that the challenged instruction 
was prejudicial; and the overwhelming evidence 
against appellant prevents this singular instruction 
from being prejudicial under the circumstances, 
even if its presentation was improper. 
The record indicates that Laura Lund became 
hysterical after appellant hit her several times 
(Tr.56-57, 160). Laura's testimony and the severity 
of the beating she received also suggest that she 
was in shock when the rape occurred. It is not un-
reasonable to believe that Laura Lund was physically 
unable to resist appellant's sexual attack because 
of her hysteria and shock. The jury was entitled 
to weigh the credibility of Laura's testimony and 
determine the effect and nature of her ability to resist. 
Paragraph 3 of instruction 25 properly posed the 
possibility that Laura Lund was physically unable to 
resist appellant's attack. 
The rule concerning misleading instructions is 
found in State v. Coleman, 17 Ut. 2d 166, 406 P.2d 
308 (1965) where this court states that generally 
all instructions should be considered together when 
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:; 
the giving of any one instruction is claimed as error. 
Paragraph 3 of instruction 25 was not reversible error 
when correctly interpreted and viewed together with 
all the other instructions. 
The language of paragraph 3 is taken verbatum 
from Utah Code Annotated§ 76-5-406(3). Appellant cites 
no cases or authority in support of his interpretation 
of "physically unable to resist." Moreover, the 
language of § 76-5-406 indicates that appellant's 
reading of subsection (3) is incorrect. Appellant 
interprets subsection (3) to include the use of drugs 
to incapacitate a victim. However, subsection (6) 
explicitly deals with the use of drugs and it is 
unreasonable to construe subsection (3) to include 
conduct expressly covered in another subsection. 
Subsection (3) also speaks explicitly of a victim being 
"unconscious" so that the phrase "physically unable 
to resist" logically implies another kind of help-
lessness. Subsection (3) gives no indication on its 
face that appellant's interpretation is valid. Rather 
the plain language of subsection (3) and the rest of 
§ 76-5-406 contemplate exactly the kind of physical 
incapacity to resist which Laura Lund experienced. 
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A consideration of the other instructions also 
leads to the conclusion that paragraph 3 of In-
struction 25 was not prejudicial or even improper. 
Instruction 37 (R.451) stated that all the instructions 
should be reviewed together and that no single in-
struction was to be singled out. Instruction 38 
(R.452) explained that if an instruction only applies 
to a state of facts found not to exist (i.e. paragraph 
3 of Instruction 25) then the jury must disregard the 
instruction. The jury was also warned that the 
fear of the victim must be the result of an actual 
source (Instruction 27, R. 441). In light of 
these instructions paragraph 3 of Instruction 25 was 
proper and was not prejudicial to appellant. 
Case law dealing with allegedly improper 
instructions establishes the concept that if the 
giving of an instruction is deemed error it is not 
reversible error unless it is shown to be prejudicial. 
People v. Trujillo, (Colo.) 527 P.2d 52 (1974); 
People v. Barker, 180 Colo. 28t 501 P.2d 1041 (1972). 
No such showi~g is rendered here. Not only was paragraph 
3 of Instruction 25 supported by the evidence but 
there was substantial evidence supporting the other parts 
of the instruction. 
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Laura Lund's resistance was reasonable under 
the circumstances and appellant's threats would 
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. 
Appellant refers to State v. Pachecr, 27 U.2d 
45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1972) in support of his claim 
that paragraph 3 of Instruction 25 was improper. 
Pachecr however, has little similarity to the instant 
case. In Pachecr, the defendant was charged with grand 
larceny (of a rifle). No other persons were charged 
with the crime or implicated in its commission. The 
trial court, however, instructed the jury that 
Pachecr could be found guilty of aiding and abetting 
in the commission of a felony, a crime for which he 
was not charged or tried. In the present case, 
the challenged instruction was taken verbatum from 
a statute concerning consent in sexual assault cases, 
the crime for which appellant was charged. There 
was evidence presented which justified each paragraph 
of the challenged instruction and the jury was cautioned 
to disregard instructions not supported by the facts. 
Also, the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. 
Trujillo, supra, expressly authorized an instruction 
containing all the statutory sections on intent even 
though all sections were not applicable. 
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Under the above circumstances, the giving of 
instruction 25 was clearly supported by the evidence, 
did not mislead or confuse the jury, and was not 
prejudicial. Appellant's conviction therefore, 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent maintains that the trial court 
correctly denied appellant's motion to reduce Count 
II to simple rape, correctly instructed the jury on 
the amount and nature of resistance required in a 
rape case and correctly instructed the jury on 
elements of consent. Wherefore, respondent respect-
fully submits that the conviction and sentence of the 
appellantshould be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully >ubmitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORICS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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